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  <title>DSpace Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/2328/26102" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>http://hdl.handle.net/2328/26102</id>
  <updated>2013-05-23T11:43:50Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2013-05-23T11:43:50Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Insider Power, Outsider Ineffectiveness and Wage Setting Institutions: Evidence from Australia</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/2328/26182" />
    <author>
      <name>Dobbie, M.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/2328/26182</id>
    <updated>2012-08-21T06:58:10Z</updated>
    <published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Insider Power, Outsider Ineffectiveness and Wage Setting Institutions: Evidence from Australia
Authors: Dobbie, M.
Abstract: Insider-outsider theories have been advanced to explain a range of phenomena,&#xD;
principally the persistence of unemployment. This paper uses data from the&#xD;
Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995, and regional labour&#xD;
force survey data, to test this model. The paper also examines how enterprise&#xD;
bargaining influences the relative power positions of insiders and outsiders.&#xD;
The paper finds provisional support for the insider-outsider distinction, and for&#xD;
the idea that enterprise level wage bargaining enhances insider power at the&#xD;
expense of outsiders.</summary>
    <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Labour Market Reforms and Lockouts in New Zealand</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/2328/26181" />
    <author>
      <name>Perry, L J</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/2328/26181</id>
    <updated>2012-11-20T01:54:13Z</updated>
    <published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Labour Market Reforms and Lockouts in New Zealand
Authors: Perry, L J
Abstract: This paper reviews New Zealand’s experience of lockouts over the last nearly two&#xD;
decades. It employs published and unpublished official (Statistics New Zealand)&#xD;
data plus unofficial data on the following, hitherto ignored, dimensions of lockouts:&#xD;
(i) employees involved in lockouts, (ii) person-days lost due to lockouts and (iii)&#xD;
the average duration of lockouts. The patterns of lockouts are compared for&#xD;
different New Zealand politico-legislative eras from 1986 to 2004. It is found that&#xD;
there has been, over time, a declining trend in the incidence of person-days lost&#xD;
due both to strikes and to lockouts in New Zealand. But the relative incidence of&#xD;
person-days lost due to lockouts vis a vis strikes rose quite sharply during the&#xD;
middle years of the operation of the union-hostile Employment Contracts Act,&#xD;
1991. Comparisons are made with Australian experience. There are some notable&#xD;
similarities in the pattern of lockouts in both countries, including the tendency&#xD;
for the average duration of lockouts to be considerably longer than the average&#xD;
the duration of strikes.</summary>
    <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Voting with Their Feet: Family Friendliness and Parent Employment in Australian Industries, 1981-2001</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/2328/26180" />
    <author>
      <name>Strazdins, L.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Broom, D.H.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Mayerkort, S.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Warren, B.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/2328/26180</id>
    <updated>2013-01-25T03:58:00Z</updated>
    <published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Voting with Their Feet: Family Friendliness and Parent Employment in Australian Industries, 1981-2001
Authors: Strazdins, L.; Broom, D.H.; Mayerkort, S.; Warren, B.
Abstract: Most Australian industries have instigated some family-friendly provisions, but&#xD;
these vary. In some industries, the span of ordinary work hours has also changed,&#xD;
requiring work on evenings, weekends and holidays. Have these changes affected&#xD;
where parents work? Charting 1981 to 2001 Census data, we found that fathers&#xD;
showed an overall decline as a proportion of employed men, with little difference&#xD;
among industries. Mothers also declined as a proportion of employed women, but&#xD;
with divergent industry trends. Retail showed a steep (7 per cent) drop in mothers,&#xD;
following the deregulation of shopping hours. By contrast, the industry with the&#xD;
most family-friendly conditions at the start of the study period (public service)&#xD;
increased its share of mothers by 6 percent.</summary>
    <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Protecting Employee Entitlements: Corporate Governance and Industrial Democracy in Australia</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/2328/26179" />
    <author>
      <name>Burgess, J.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Lewer, J.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Waring, P.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/2328/26179</id>
    <updated>2012-08-23T00:23:04Z</updated>
    <published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Protecting Employee Entitlements: Corporate Governance and Industrial Democracy in Australia
Authors: Burgess, J.; Lewer, J.; Waring, P.
Abstract: The protection of employee entitlements has been an issue of public policy&#xD;
debate following several major corporate failures including HIH and Ansett. While&#xD;
protection remains paramount on the public policy agenda and in the campaigns&#xD;
of trade unions, we argue that there is an equally important, yet neglected issue&#xD;
associated with employee entitlements. Employees are involuntary lenders of&#xD;
capital to their employing organisations. They do not receive interest on their&#xD;
loans and importantly they are invariably denied information, monitoring and&#xD;
voice rights within their organisations. In this article we argue that these rights&#xD;
should be granted to reduce risk to entitlements and in exchange for employer&#xD;
access to this capital.</summary>
    <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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