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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2328/26484

Title: The completely mixed stochastic game
Authors: Filar, Jerzy A
Keywords: Mathematics
Stochastic modelling
Matrix games
Issue Date: 1985
Publisher: American Mathematical Society
Citation: Filar, J.A., 1985. The completely mixed single-controller stochastic game. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 95(4), 585-594.
Abstract: We consider a zero-sum stochastic game with finitely many states and actions. Further we assume that the transition probabilities depend on the actions of only one player (player II, in our case), and that the game is completely mixed. That is, every optimal stationary strategy for either player assigns a positive probability to every action in every state. For these games, properties analogous to those derived by Kaplansky for the completely mixed matrix games, are established in this paper. These properties lead to the counter-intuitive conclusion that the controller need not know the law of motion in order to play optimally, but his opponent does not have this luxury.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2328/26484
ISSN: 0002-9939
Appears in Collections:Computer Science, Engineering and Mathematics - Collected Works

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