This is George Lewkowicz for the Don Dunstan Foundation Don Dunstan Oral History Project interviewing Mr Brian Chatterton. Brian was a Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests, I think, in the Dunstan Governments of the latter part of the ’70s and then was a minister again under the John Bannon Government. The date today is the 17th September 2011 and the location of the interview is in Umbria, Italy.

Brian, thanks very much for doing the interview for the Don Dunstan Oral History Project. Can you just provide some brief background about yourself, so readers of the transcript of the interview will know who you are and your early education, and then how you got into politics and the advancements you made there? But we’ll just do the brief introduction first.

Well, I was born in India in 1941. My parents were living there. My father was English, and he was working in India. When he’d graduated from London University he worked for an Indian company in Calcutta. And my mother was Australian, very much Establishment Adelaide; in fact, the only time that I can remember Don Dunstan being totally lost for words was once at Ayers House. We were entertaining some foreign visitors and he was telling the story of the restoration of Ayers House, and I happened to say that Henry Ayers was my great-great-grandfather. And (laughs) Don was a bit startled at that. But I went to a Montessori kindergarten in India, and then, at Independence, like most British people, my father left India and we were nomads. We first went to England and my mother took one look at postwar England and said, ‘I don’t want to live here.’ So we then went back to Australia while my father still looked for a job, and finally he ended up at the Tramways Trust in Adelaide. And I went to St Peter’s [College] – like Don Dunstan, (laughs) and like John Bannon; it seems to be that St Peter’s is a hotbed of socialism.

Very much. (telephone rings, break in recording)

So I went to school at St Peter’s. And then, later, my father went back to India because the World Bank had provided some funds to the company he worked with
and they were expanding and asked him to come back. So I had a fascinating childhood with schooling in Adelaide and summer holidays in India.

Then I went to university in England, University of Reading, and did an agricultural degree, and came back to South Australia, where my mother had inherited a farm at Lyndoch and I took the farm over and restored it, because it had been in total decline since my great-grandfather had died in 1942. It had been in the hands of a trustee and they just maintained it at the bare minimum.

I became interested in politics in the 1960s, and I think there were many issues, like the Vietnam War and so on, which made me more active. And I joined the local branch of the Labor Party at Williamstown, and they tried to make me president the first time I attended.

Oh, really?

Which I declined. (laughs) Williamstown was part, then, of Molly Byrne’s electorate, and so I was involved there. When the election – I just can’t remember which one it would have been, in 1967 I think – was called Molly Byrne asked me to stand for Angas, because there was no Labor candidate there and she was worried that all the Liberal supporters would come down from Angas and campaign in Barossa, which was her seat – it was called ‘Barossa’ then. So I stood as a Labor candidate. After that I became very friendly with David Combe, and then he asked me to stand for Wakefield in the federal election, which again was another hopeless seat. But it was a way to get into Labor politics for somebody who didn’t have any union connections or any strong urban sub-branch connection. After that I stood for Light, which was one of the new seats that had been created after the Steele Hall redistribution, which was a marginal seat, but I didn’t win that.

After that Mick Young hinted to me I had earned my spurs and I should get a chance at a reasonably good seat, having stood three times for the Labor Party, so he said, ‘Well, you know, Elizabeth will be coming up.’ I stood for preselection for Elizabeth. By that stage Mick had moved to Canberra and had bigger fish to fry than to organise my preselection, so Peter Duncan got Elizabeth – to whom I am totally indebted, because I think (laughs) it would have been the most horrendous
thing to be Member for Elizabeth. I certainly, in retrospect, feel he did me the greatest favour ever.

After that, there weren’t going to be any preselections around for some time. Lloyd Hughes, who had been member for Moonta lost the seat in the previous election with the redistribution. Don – you know, genuinely always did look after people – had arranged so he had been preselected for the Legislative Council. He decided to withdraw his preselection for ill health, and so that came up, and this time I got it with David Combe’s help. Then there was the whole campaign for Legislative Council, which you know all about, and the street order, rolls and all those sorts of things. I became a member of the Legislative Council; that was in the ’73 election.

’73, right. Okay, good. Did you find out why the Party was interested in recruiting you, specifically?

I think I was lucky, in the sense that one of the things that we could put across was in Midland, which was the name of Legislative Council seat then, was, (while we were going to win it on the votes of Elizabeth/Salisbury,) was really a huge rural seat and it was a good idea for the Labor Party to have someone who had a rural background and could handle that side of it. After all look at the incredible efforts that Don had gone to to get Casey into the Legislative Council. Casey had held the seat of Frome and he lost that, and Don had got him into the Legislative Council, because Don felt he needed somebody as Minister of Agriculture who could talk to the farmers. Casey’s agricultural background was fairly dubious anyway – I think he had a pub in Peterborough – but Don felt that it was important to do that, and I think that, while I didn’t at that stage deal a great deal with Don he had contact with David Combe and they felt it would be a good idea to have more members with rural expertise.

And were you articulating rural policy at the time, or – – –?

Yes – oh, sure. I was on the Rural Policy Committee in the background. Certainly when I became a member of Parliament that happened. Don always went to talk to people who knew something rather than through official lines, and before I became
Minister Don had had this great spat with the Department of Agriculture. He had a couple of things that he’d done that he was very angry about.

Firstly, he asked them (Department of Agriculture) what they were there for, and they had replied by saying, ‘Well, we answered 500,000 telephone calls and we wrote so many minutes and we did all this.’ A list of activity to no particular purpose.

He’d also asked the Department of Agriculture if they could do something about introducing new fruit and vegetable crops, and they said, ‘No.’

He said, ‘But this is government policy.’

‘Yeah, well, it’s not our policy.’ (laughter)

So with Tom Casey not prepared to take it up, he ended up in putting this Fruit and Vegetable Development Officer at the Botanic Gardens, which he’d tried to put into the Department of Agriculture.

Anyway, then he instituted this review – the Callaghan Report – on the Department of Agriculture, and Callaghan had been a previous Director of Agriculture who went on to other things in Canberra, particularly the Australian Wheat Board, and he produced this report which was to give some new directions but not change the old directions. And Don looked at it and said, ‘My god, this means we have two Departments of Agriculture, and who’s going to pay for all this?’ His attitude was to reject it out of hand as a great extravagance.

Before he did that – I was a back-bencher then – he asked me to come to Norwood – not to his office – where we could talk this over. I said, ‘Well, I think we should go ahead with this report, subject to the fact that it’s got to be done within the existing manpower, and we’ll go into these new directions.’ Because my philosophy, in terms of agriculture, was so different from what had gone before.

The Department of Agriculture had been organised on commodity lines – a real Marxist fetish of the commodities philosophy. So you had the cereal division and you had the sheep and the cattle and the poultry and everything else.– My idea was that we should concentrate on farmers, who have a mixture of all these things. The purpose of the – well, the part of the report that I took from Callaghan, was the regionalisation: that we should concentrate on regions and cover everything in that
region rather than have a centralised organisation which didn’t have any coordination at a regional level. We had regional offices, but we had a place like Mount Gambier where we had a whole staff who were responsible to 17 different people in Adelaide, and no regional director or head of the regional unit. I was able to convince Don that we could use this report to make this quite substantial change. Of course, it’s now gone back the other way again. (laughter)

Yes, as things do.

That’s right.

Just going back to the earlier period, I recall there was a rural policy written for the 1970 election, and I think it was the first one ever done for the Labor Party, and I guess you were involved in that.

I was involved in that, yes.

Okay. You said you were a member of the Rural Policy Committee.

Yes.

How did that actually work, and where did the ideas come from?

Well, it was one of the platform committees, and it came from (laughs) – a lot of them came from me.

Right.

In fact, I’d already quite unintentionally written some federal policy before then. When I stood for the Federal Seat of Wakefield and Mick Young was Acting Secretary of the Party at that stage, it was a time when wheat quotas had come in, because we couldn’t sell all our Australian wheat overseas. The Federal Government decided to establish quotas and farmers were furious because they had a lot of over-quota wheat.

I wrote a policy on what to do with the over-quota wheat, and as a humble candidate I couldn’t launch a Labor Party policy, so I sent it off to Mick in Canberra and said, ‘Can I use this?’

He rang me up and said, ‘I’ve printed it as a pamphlet. It’s going all round Australia.’ (laughs)
And it even stunned Rex Paterson, who was our spokesman, and he picked it up, says, ‘Yeah, that’s okay. Let’s go with it’ – – –.’ (laughter)

**When you were doing this policy thinking, was it just picking out bits of things or was it looking at the rural sector and saying, ‘Listen, if we want to get things improving here this is the sort of strategic stuff’?**

I think more what you’re saying, *ad hoc*, for a particular sort of crisis like wheat: ‘What are we going to do?’ It was providing an alternative to what the Federal Government was doing, and until I got more involved in politics as a member of parliament and then minister, did I really have more of a vision of what we were going to do overall.

With this change in the Department, an emphasis on the farmer rather than on the product, while I said to you it’s all been reversed, the interesting thing is that quite unintentionally to me was that I had a opportunity to put this into practice with the drought, and that *has* stayed. In other words, the old drought policies were all really designed to counteract or to overcome the symptoms of drought. So if the sheep were starving you provided subsidised hay. If there was some other problem you provided something else. I said, ‘Well, that’s not our job. That’s what a farmer’s got to do. We’re to help the farmer. So we provide an alternative source of cheap finance. Leave the farmer to make his decision whether he’s going to kill the sheep or he’s going to feed them or he’s going to feed them on hay or grain or whatever. It is stupid that we should interfere in the market.’ This was incredible: there’s the whole of this drought policy developed over the previous four, five decades by right-wing governments, and I’m coming in and saying, ‘Look, let the farmer have the freedom to manage his own farm and let the market sort out which is the best option. We come in to provide the additional finance to make this happen.’ And the fascinating thing is – I had no idea I was going to be responsible for drought, because the drought was in the Department of Lands. Things were getting so bad Don transferred drought to me. So I implemented the new approach; and the extraordinary thing is years later, decades later, when I was no longer Minister, I happened to find the national drought policy that had been developed federally
Interesting, isn’t it, yes. And you talked about the departmental reaction; what about the rural community’s reaction to the changes you’d been bringing in?

Well, the rural community was really stunned at first, because you couldn’t get a greater contrast between Tom Casey and myself. Tom left his diary behind when I became Minister, and I noticed that he had been talking to the rural community, the various lobby groups, for breakfast, lunch and dinner every day of the week. He really worked that circuit. When I became Minister I told my secretary, ‘No, I’m not having any of this. If they want something, they’ve got to come and see me. And they’ve got to send me a piece of paper beforehand to tell me what’s the subject of this discussion.’ They found this very, very difficult, really hard work. Then, some years later, one of them – Grant Andrews or somebody, who was the Secretary of the United Farmers and Graziers – he said, ‘You know, that was really difficult. We used to go in and we’d have these great lunches with Tom Casey and he would promise us the world, and,’ he said, ‘nothing ever happened, at all. And,’ he said, ‘we’d come in and see you and you’d say, “Yes,” “No,” “Yes,” “No,” “Yes,” “No.” When you said “Yes” it happened; when you said “No”, it didn’t happen. But,’ he said, ‘we now realise that,’ and he said that it was a very difficult thing for them to understand to start with. (laughs)

How did those groups work, the – I’ll call them the lobby groups or the farmers – there was a UF&G and the Graziers were the big ones, weren’t they?

Yes. Then there were hundreds of others – the sort of thing I was talking about, commodity: grape growers –

Oh yes, that’s true, yes.

– orange growers, potato growers, apple growers, the egg people, the pig people.

Yes, gee.

I mean, almost everybody had this. There were heaps also of little boards, too, that were responsible direct to the Minister, not to the Department of Agriculture.
You said you were saying ‘Yes,’ ‘No.’ What was that based on?

Well, it was based on - they would say, ‘We would like a – can you do this or can you do that? Could we have this done?’ And I would say, ‘Well, no, we haven’t got the resources to do that now; we’re not going to do it,’ and better just tell them straight out. But Tom would say, ‘Oh yes, of course we can.’ But I would, provided they provided the paper beforehand, would check it out with the Department and say, ‘Well, no, we can’t do that. Yes, we can do this,’ et cetera. The other thing which we did, which stunned them (the farmer groups), was the fact that – this was when Lynne came to work for me – is that we sorted out the legislative process. Everybody had said, ‘Look, nothing ever gets passed for Department of Agriculture, no Acts of Parliament. The obvious reason is the Labor Party hates rural people and they couldn’t care less about rural legislation.’ Well, it was not that at all; it was total incompetence on the part of the Department. We – this is part of Don’s reorganisation of the legislative program, and he gave Des Corcoran the job of organising the legislative program and we all got so many slots. So I got – this was the first year I was Minister – got these five slots. I said, ‘Well, where are the bills?’ And there wasn’t anything. It was just total chaos. And the process was that somebody had an idea we ought to amend this Act or something, and then it would be circulated, and then it would be circulated again, and then there’d be amendments in circulation. And I said, ‘Look, we’ve got to find the five bits that are important and we’ve got to organise a process that this is going to come to a conclusion.’ We did that, and we had the five pieces of legislation and we got them all through Parliament. People like Grant Andrews said, ‘That’s amazing!’ (laughter) These were quite substantial pieces, like a total reorganisation of the Country Fire Services and things like that, and it was all a matter of getting the people to meet certain deadlines for getting draft bills, getting draft cabinet submissions, et cetera, all organised on time. Nothing like this had been done before.

Had some been supported by inquiries of whatever sort?
Yes. Sometimes there were inquiries. But often it was quite internal, but it was just this inability of anybody to manage the process. It required – even when I introduced this system, they couldn’t really cope - that is the bureaucrats. I would have a meeting, for example, and say, ‘Right, now, these are the key players. We have the draft bill. I’m going to go through it, clause by clause. Any objections? Anything?’ and so on. We would finalise the bill and so that was it. I would say, ‘Right. That’s it. It’s finalised.’ Then, an hour later, Lynne would ring me up and say, ‘Bob Docherty’s been on the phone and he has said that the Director of such-and-such has been onto him saying that he would like an amendment to clause 7(b).’

They went direct to him.

Yes. I said, ‘No! We had a meeting. He agreed. No.’ I said, ‘Tell Bob Docherty that is the draft and we are not going to play this game,’ which is what they had been doing before, ‘of more amendments, new ideas, et cetera.’ (laughs)

Amazing, yes – god, what a way to run things.

I know. I know. (laughter)

You were a minister in the Cabinet. How did you get to be the Minister?

Well, obviously, from the period before, the fact that Don was consulting me on agriculture was significant and it had been tipped that I was going to be Agriculture. The railways bill and the snap election that followed precipitated it. Don had anticipated this election in advance. He had got Frank Kneebone to retire. Don Banfield moved up to being Leader in the Legislative Council and he moved Tom Casey sideways into Lands. Tom was not happy at all because there were no opportunities, to speak of, for having lunches, breakfasts or dinners in Lands at all. I mean, that was not a place that you got duchessed. I got Agriculture and Forests.

After the Caucus meeting when I was elected as a minister, Don said to me, ‘Oh, by the way, look, I’m going to give you Fisheries as well.’ He said, ‘But I haven’t quite cleared up all the bits, so don’t tell anybody; but you’re going to be Minister of Fisheries as well. Of course, (laughs) that was incredible because I’d never caught a fish in my life. It was interesting, because there was a total change in policy by
Don. Somebody had prepared a report – I think from the Policy Unit – pointing out that Fisheries was a management issue for commercial exploitation, and the previous approach to Fisheries had been very much conservation, limits on catches, fish sizes, *et cetera, et cetera*. and that we should be doing more to develop Fisheries, and so he felt that it should move from the Department of Conservation under Broomhill to Agriculture, which was a development area. So he gave Fisheries to me, and, because there was a lot of money around, he said, ‘Oh, and incidentally I’ve doubled the budget.’ (laughs) I said, ‘Oh?’ Which actually we couldn’t spend, because no way we could do it in the time available.

**Yes. There was some chap from Canada came out – – –.**

Yes. Parzival Copes, yes.

**That’s right.**

Yes, Parzival Copes.

**Yes. He worked with Milton Smith.**

That’s right, yes.

**I think Geoff Byrne[?] was involved, and later on Ross Hardings[?].**

Yes.

**Yes, interesting.**

Yes. And Lynne and I have written a couple of articles on fisheries management since then in academic journals.

**So you became the Minister. What were your impressions when you went to your first cabinet meeting?**

Well, it was interesting because there wasn’t a lot of cabinet discussion. There was bickering that seemed to go on between Hugh Hudson and Geoff Virgo and Des Corcoran. After this had gone on for a little while Don said, ‘Okay, shut up and let’s get on with things,’ or words to that effect. It seemed to me that, really, the major decisions were not made in Cabinet; they were outside.
You had to understand the code, and the code was that nothing was ever rejected, because that would humiliate the minister. So you got your cabinet submission “approved” or ‘referred to Minister’ but you were given the nod in Cabinet that was not approved, so take it away and bury it. It wasn’t rejected outright but you had to understand the signals. Sometimes “referred to Minister” meant, ‘Take it away, rewrite it and bring it back,’ and other times it meant, ‘No, that’s not a goer at all.’ so bury it. It wasn’t an outright rejection.

I found very quickly that the Department was appalling at writing cabinet submissions, and so it ended up that Lynne and I wrote them all ourselves because they were so badly structured. It wasn’t anything else. They just wandered all over the place, they didn’t get their arguments in logical sequence, et cetera. I had a very good record after we started rewriting them. I had a feeling, obviously, you don’t put up things to Cabinet that you know are not a goer anyway so that I did reasonably well once we got the cabinet submissions into order.

And that’d included, ‘Well, this is what the various constituencies think of this?’

Oh, yes, to say – yes.

And how it’s going to be received and all that.

Yes.

Plus any impact on any other department around the place.

Well, that’s right. I don’t know whether it ever happened afterwards, but when the Bannon Government came in I actually prepared a checklist, which I gave to Bannon, which he circulated for a while, that people should have all this information and they should tick it all off. But I’d been doing it on a less formalised basis before that, yes.

Did the other ministers buy into your area at all?

Des Corcoran, yes. He liked to interfere, because he felt he was a father figure for agriculture. But I didn’t really have trouble with Des, Don would always shut him up if thing became intractable.
Oh, really?

Yes. Don could see that (laughs) Des and I did not see eye to eye on anything. Des was the great dealmaker. He felt he could buy these people off. I realised that half the time you just had to stick to your guns. While Grant Andrews and others might be saying something, it really wasn’t in the best interest of farmers, and at times you just had to argue your point and say, ‘Well, look, no, I don’t agree with you and I’m not going along with this at all.’

And did you buy into any other ministers’ areas at all?

No, not really, no.

So you generally were ..... ..... ..... ..... 

I think Crossman (Richard Crossman one of the first British Ministers to write a cabinet diary) makes this distinction about cabinet ministers and departmental ministers; and certainly during that period, in Don’s Cabinet, I was very much a departmental minister. I wasn’t involved in some of the other things. I think the only time I can remember when I once put a spoke in Hugh Hudson’s wheel, when he was raving on about how safe nuclear power was.

Oh, yes – oh, gosh.

And he came up with this great furphy which is commonly used by the nuclear power industry that it’s so safe because they’ve found these relics of natural reactors that have just died a natural death. And he said, ‘Look, that shows you even if you do get a meltdown it doesn’t matter.’

I said, ‘Hugh, that only shows that those are the ones we’ve got left. The ones that blew up and disappeared and created pollution left no trace. We have no idea how many of those there were.’

‘Oh, god,’ he said, ‘you’re quite right.’ (laughter)

Yes, I might come back to uranium later on. Where did the rural policy fit into the importance of things in the Cabinet? Was it seen as, ‘Well, that’s your area and we’re not too fussed about it’?

Yes.
Oh, right. So it wasn’t seen as a big deal policy area.

No, not a big deal policy. In the Caucus people had to be dragooned to come onto my caucus committee. I think most of them liked it once they were there, because I tried to involve them as much as possible, but they didn’t put it down as their first choices, and very rarely did I get a full committee. People had to be told, ‘Well, there are too many people on this committee; somebody’s got to go on Agriculture.’ There were people who wanted to be on Fishing, that was more popular. Agriculture wasn’t. It was horrendous how at times the sheer lack of just professionalism within the public administration. Don was so good at public administration. He really transformed the public service, but he hadn’t got round to Agriculture.

When I took over, for example, the drought from Lands, I asked them as we were paying out all this money, ‘Well, where are the cabinet approvals for this?’

‘Oh. Mm. Good point. We don’t have any.’

And I said, ‘What? We’re paying out all this money to farmers to do this and the farmers to do that, and you’ve got no approval whatsoever?’

‘No, no, none at all.’

And so I prepared this huge cabinet submission for all the drought measures that we were doing, et cetera, et cetera, and put this into Cabinet, and of course your policy group had already looked at it and Don had talked about it, so came in and Hugh Hudson said, ‘What? How can we pay? Where can we find all this money?’

Don said, ‘Don’t worry. It’s all organised. It’s just tying up all the loose ends ..... ..... ..... .....’ (laughs)

Interesting. I’ve always been curious that Agriculture’s always been, in South Australia, an important part of the economy, if you like – there’s all these people that have been supporting that part of the economy, like the Department and all these research bodies and universities. If you looked at the other parts of the economy, the people supporting that were, in fraction terms, probably a tenth – like the Economic Development Unit or whatever they were – but still there was this resistance to reform until you came along and then the Department took all this time to start to get its act together. You’ve thought about that a bit –

Yes.
– and I think you wrote about it in your book, *Roosters and feather dusters*.

Yes.

**So what was your observation?**

The point you’re making is very valid and it’s also used by other people like the World Bank and I counteract this by saying yes, that’s perfectly true, that if you look at the section of the state budget which was going on agriculture compared to industry, and yet the contribution by the 1970s of industry was so many times more. Agriculture had a totally different structure. You had mostly family farms, therefore they had no capacity to do their own research; they were too busy farming; so somebody else had to do the research for them. The other point which I think is extremely important at the moment, is that we should do public research because the research that’s done in agriculture often can’t be patented. We do a biological control program; we have an insect; we release it. We can’t say, ‘You can only have it if you’ve paid your patent fee,’ because it’s released everywhere. Worldwide we’re suffering from a lack of public research because we have people like the World Bank who have put forward this argument: ‘There’s no need for the public financing of research; leave it all to Monsanto.’ And so we end up with genetically-modified organisms. We end up with a chemical solution to everything. There’s been lots of studies done of this, that publicly-funded research in agriculture has been declining in real terms for the last half-century and it’s all been moving into companies, which have an agenda that they’ve got to sell something to the farmer.

Yes. Interesting. So the mentality of the Department was what? You talked about commodities focus, but did they see themselves as being very important to this economy, or they were just doing their thing?

Yes, they saw themselves very important to the economy. They, with the farmers, saw themselves as being very badly treated by Labor. They really had a chip on their shoulders about that. I think I managed to change that completely. If they only got their act together they would get a good deal from Don Dunstan and the Labor Party, but it was really their lack of organisation as much as anything else. But it was interesting, because it was very hard to get them to think in these more strategic
And I used to have what Lynne and I used to refer to as ‘struggle sessions’.

(laughter)

Not aeroplane sessions or anything.

No. (laughter) And these were fascinating, because I would get in some group of
the Department and I would ask them to write on one side of an A4 sheet what their
objectives were. Nobody ever achieved that; it was always more than one page.
(laughs) I would say, ‘Right, let’s go through this, what it’s all about. What are your
objectives and how are you going to achieve them?’ et cetera. And nobody had ever
done this with them before. I would do this not just in head office with the Directors
but also go to Ceduna or Port Lincoln and get them all in and say, ‘Right, let’s go
through. What’s it all about? Why are you here? What are you doing? What’s this
all about?’ And I think they responded after a while; but to start with they were
really scared stiff. (laughs)

And you got some new people in, is that correct?

Yes, got a few new people in – most important, got a new Director-General, and
then other new people involved.

Who was it?

This was –

Jim, was it?

– Jim McColl, that’s right. And then other people. Some people survived. Others
didn’t, they really couldn’t stand the Department's ways and they left and went to
join the Department of Further Education. (laughs) Bureaucratic politics are
terrible. I tried to open it up a lot, but succeed only to a limited degree. I saw the
Department of Agriculture as something like a university rather than a government
department. I don’t think that governments can have policies on what you should
feed pigs. This was something new, where there’d been very tight bureaucratic
control of everything.

I can remember on one occasion that somebody in Department of Agriculture in
some branch office had done what I thought was a great idea of comparing different
ways of selling cattle, and this had not shown Elders up in a very good light. So I got this furious letter from Elders saying, ‘Why is the Department of Agriculture opposed to us?’ et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

And so my secretary said, ‘Oh, you know, we’d better – – –.’

I said, ‘No, we won’t. We will get the person in the branch office and he’s going to go and talk to Elders and I am not going to interfere. If he’s got the evidence, that’s fine by me. I’m not going to back Elders and I’m not backing the Department. It’s something that’s got to be sorted out on those grounds.’ Everybody expected, I’d immediately back down – because Elders were a powerful group, and that I would tell him to shut up. (laughs)

Too right, yes. Interesting. And you got David Harvey in. What was his role?

Yes. David was involved in a new group that we set up which was very much, I’d talked to Don about this and this was what Don wanted – involved with new crops, new enterprises and market opportunities. So we looked at various crops we could grow in South Australia which hadn’t been grown before. One of our big successes was coriander seed, and South Australia for a while became the largest producer of coriander seed in the world. Coriander seed is normally backyard production and we did it on a mass scale and planted hundreds of hectares of it.

Interesting, yes. And apart from coriander he was – was he going out to talk to the farmers?

It was a totally new thing: ‘market development’, we called it. We had this as part of the economics area, and the idea was to get market development – not just new crops, but market development for existing people as well. He did a couple of overseas trips, trade missions and things like that. It was very tricky to deal with these people – I mean, we’ve changed to some extent in Australia; but when I was in the Gulf. I found all these Australian products, packaged in London, it was just incredible. Our sultanas were going into Kuwait via London. My thing was, ‘Well, why on earth are we doing this? Why can’t we put the sultanas in a cellophane packet and do it ourselves?’ We were trying to push people into getting involved directly rather than going through some of these central trading areas. That again, is
what Don was trying to do in Malaysia. Instead of sending our stuff to Malaysia via Japan why didn’t we try and build up a direct link?

Yes – and you supported those projects.

Yes, yes.

What did you think about them as they sort of developed and then sort of disappeared?

Well, the Malaysian thing, I think, was an interesting idea. It’s fascinating that it’s going so well now. It collapsed really when Don retired. It was so far ahead of its time. I think the problem with the Malaysian thing was in a sense it came from an idea rather than from what was happening on the ground. So Don had links with Malaysia and felt, ‘Well, this is a good idea. Can we develop it?’ I had, of course, in a sense, approached trade other way round, I was saying – we had a market for woodchips in India and so we could try and develop a direct link with India rather than sending the woodchips to Japan and then to India, which is what was the natural route at the time. Japan, America and Europe were the great trade people who gathered all these commodities and then distributed them out again.

Right. Gee.

In a sense, with Libya and Algeria and Jordan, I was trying to build links because we really had something that we could trade. That was, I think, the failure in Malaysia. Of course the real thing to trade didn’t come till later, which was education, and that really should have been Don’s starting point and to have built that Malaysian relationship on education.

Yes – based on the old Colombo Plan.

Yes.

And were the wrong people involved, or everybody seemed to be a bit vague about all of this stuff?

Sometimes, yes. Sometimes they were. I had one of the most embarrassing times I’ve ever had in Parliament when Bob Bakewell had – when we were in Malaysia on one of these trade things, the Malaysians kept on saying that one of the resources
that they had and which they didn’t know what to do with, was rice straw. Bob Bakewell had known this. I did to but never took it up or nobody asked me to. He had got some consultants together to do this incredibly expensive report about what they were going do with this rice straw. They were going to process it and turn it into sheep pellets and bring it out to Australia! This report was released without telling me, and of course everybody in the Legislative Council with a rural background just laughed. Why on earth would you bring sheep feed into Australia? We’re great exporters of sheep feed. We export sheep, we export barley for sheep feed, we export lucerne hay to Singapore, et cetera; and the idea of producing this highly-expensive feed – because you had to do an awful lot of chemical treatment to turn it into something eatable –  

Oh, gosh.

– and this was going to be bought to South Australia. I couldn’t defend it. I had to waffle away (laughs). It was really appalling that they hadn’t consulted me at all, and they did tend to do that at times. They felt the Department of Agriculture was a lot of old fuddy-duddies and ‘We can do better.’ So that was one occasion that they did that.

The other occasion was, of course, with the Algerian project, which was really extremely funny because somehow or other this project proposal, seeking people to come and do this Algerian project, which was funded by the World Bank, came to South Australia in French, and the Department of Agriculture got hold of it and translated a few pages which referred to the technical information. Somehow I got hold of it. A lot of these documents one had difficulty getting hold of. I had the rest of it translated. Then Lynne and I prepared a response, and we got to know the Algerians very well afterwards, and they said, ‘You were the only people who understood what the project was all about. It’s not about just what happens on the ground, but how we’re going to organise the grazing and the people and all that sort of thing.’

So we looked at this project and we thought, ‘My god. We haven’t got the resources to do this half a million hectares of land in Algeria.’ So Lynne and I said,
‘Well, we’ll do 50,000 hectares instead of half a million.’ We didn’t – I mean, we were so naïve; we didn’t realise you don’t rewrite the terms of a World Bank project. It’s half a million or nothing. Anyway the Algerians were so impressed they came back to us and said, ‘Well, you can’t actually do that, but please will you take it on because we think you understand what our problems are.’ And, of course, that was fine and we said yes and so on.

Then, of course, the industrial people in industrial development in Don’s portfolio: ‘Wow! Ooh! Whacko!’ (laughter) So they thought, ‘Well, we shall get AACM to do this’ – you know, the agricultural consulting group in Adelaide – and so that was the way it was developing. Finally it all blew up, and I went to see Don and I said to Don, ‘Look. Do you know what is being done?’ I said, ‘What are they trying to do? We got this project because the Algerians think we understand the problems and they have faith in the Department of Agriculture, Minister of Agriculture, the Government. Now you’re subcontracting this to AACM and I’m supposed to take the responsibility for what they do, and it’s my reputation on the line, and I’ve got no control over AACM, and in fact my feedback on some of the projects they’d done before is pretty lousy, and we’ve really got to make a choice: we do it; or AACM do it and we have to tell the Algerians it’s nothing to do with us, in which case they’ll probably cancel it.’ He said, ‘Yes, yes, you’re quite right, yes, and AACM, they’ve got to go.’ And so we did it directly. And of course then we lost government and – god – did they foul it up! Oh, god.

So Don trusted your judgment.

Yes, yes.

Was that the way he generally worked with people?

Yes. It was really so brilliant to work with him because you could either talk to him on the phone or go and see him, and it was usually a five-minute conversation. If you could put your points to him clearly, he would grasp that immediately and say, ‘Yes, that’s it.’ And then you didn’t need to worry about bits of paper, or things like that. You also had complete confidence that, if he said that, he didn’t do what Bannon would do later – when things got hot, say, ‘Oh, well, I never meant that.’
Oh, really?

You know, he would stick to what he had said and what he understood and what I understood, and so you didn’t really feel you’ve got to get it all down on paper because otherwise he’ll back out of it.

What about coming the other way: would he have suggestions about how to improve something, or, ‘This is going to hurt us somewhere,’ or – – –?

Oh, yes. And he wanted to – yes, he would. And he would refer things to you which he felt ought to be sorted out. He wanted to get a sort of feeling for these policy developments before they became too fixed. Unfortunately it didn’t always work out, but he would try to get a meeting with you every – I think it was every two weeks or every month, I’m not sure – in which there was a very informal agenda and he really would like you just to speak in general terms. So this was outside Cabinet, outside cabinet submissions and those sorts of things, but just get some feeling for the directions that you were going in. Those meetings were very useful. Unfortunately, the pressure of things often meant they were cancelled, because they weren’t considered to be a high-priority.

But he tried to get that overview from all the ministers.

Yes.

Interesting.

And that was (laughs) quite different to all other premiers that I’ve worked with.

Just moving into the Legislative Council, there were two things I wanted to ask you about there. One was the work you were doing in the rural sector. You said earlier that the rural people were very – well, they were hostile to the Labor Government; but as things seemingly improved did they get more positive about the Labor Government?

Yes.

Did that have an impact on, like, the voting in the Legislative Council?

I think it did. With the drought, that was the most extraordinary thing because it was all a question of government administration. I didn’t introduce any great new drought measures, but we made the existing ones work. Don had made the transfer
because he couldn’t get anywhere with the Department of Lands as to why the whole system was failing. Lands Department said, ‘Oh, we’re doing our best,’ et cetera, and they couldn’t understand that farmers didn’t want to fill in 28-page forms and things like this. When the drought was over, I got incredible support from the rural community, even from the Country Party. (laughs) They sent me a letter congratulating me on the drought administration. The Member for Eyre Peninsula, who was a Country Party member, he actually got up in the House and congratulated me on the drought administration and how well it had worked and how many farmers had been helped and all those sorts of things. So it did feed through. When I had the drought committee – I had set up a drought advisory committee, and I think this is the first time it had been done – I put on Whyte – you know, he was the President of the Legislative Council, he was the Liberal – he was on the Eyre Peninsula – and I asked him, ‘Would you be the chairman of my drought advisory committee?’ I thought he was a much more neutral, independent Liberal than many of the more ideologically-driven ones. He was delighted and did a good job and we got on well with that.

And it was a very useful forum, because when some of these more harebrained drought schemes came up I would refer them to the drought advisory committee and they (laughs) would go and talk to a few people and say, ‘Now, look, this is just madness.’ The farmers were talking about giving compensation for wheat crops. I said, ‘Even if it was a fair thing, how on earth can we go and look at every wheat crop?’ (telephone rings, break in recording)

He (Arthur Whyte) would see the sense of that and I would have somebody from the Department backing him up and they would talk the advisory committee round to saying, ‘No, no, this is not a goer – it’s just administratively impossible. We don’t even have to discuss whether it’s a good idea or not because it just can’t be done.’

Were you Leader of the Legislative Council at any stage?

No, I wasn’t.

Okay.
I turned it down when Chris Sumner became Minister. That was just before Des Corcoran’s election and Tom Casey and Don Banfield retired. Sumner and Cornwall became ministers, and Sumner came to me and said, ‘Do you want to stand as Leader of the Government in the Legislative Council?’ I think if I had I would have won, because I had been a minister then for four and a half years and of course they were new people. And I said, ‘No, Chris. I feel you’re made for that job. You go ahead and have it.’ So he then became Leader in the Legislative Council.

The reason I’m asking is just to get on the record of these interviews how the Council actually worked, particularly with some of the more contentious legislation, how things were resolved. You talk about some of these instances in your book.

They always – usually - went to conferences between the two Houses and I feel that I played an absolutely vital role (laughs) in this because these conferences were decided by exhaustion. I felt it was absolutely horrendous. Don was just washed out. We would throw the bill back and forth, and then finally it came to a conference; we’d hold the conference 10 o’clock at night, go through till 5 o’clock in the morning or something like this, and it was really horrendous. And so I said to Don, about the second conference I was on, I said, ‘Look, what is this all about? Why are we doing this?’ I said, ‘Suspend standing orders. Have the conference tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock. We don’t have to go straight into conference.’ And he said, ‘Oh, god, you’re quite right.’ And after that we had our conferences at reasonable hours, and nobody had thought of this in the previous ........

The other thing that happened in terms of parliamentary reform, which I really don’t see myself as a real parliamentarian; I was much more interested in being a minister than the goings-on of Parliament – but the other change I introduced, which didn’t in this case do us any good in the Legislative Council, was I said to Chris Sumner – and this was based on some other parliament I’d been to – you know, there’s always this problem of not enough time for private member business. I said, ‘Well, Chris, why don’t you give the Opposition more private members’ time and then you can have a deal with them and you can have more government time, et cetera?’
‘Oh,’ he said, ‘we can’t do that because ministers can’t be in the House all the
time to ensure the Government has a majority.’

I said, ‘All you do – it’s very simple: you make a deal with the Opposition and
you say that they can have all the private members’ time they like but they can’t
have any votes. The votes all have to be in the time that we specify.’

He said, ‘Oh, well, how are we going to make them stick to it?’

‘Very simply,’ I said. ‘The first trick they pull on you and defeat the
Government when the ministers aren’t present is when you cancel the private
members’ time.’ I said, ‘They won’t step out of line.’ That’s what they did in the
Assembly and I think they’re still doing.

Interesting. When there are contentious issues and these conferences were
together, who was the leader for the Liberal Party? Was it the Leader of the
Opposition or was it someone like DeGaris?

No. It depended. I mean, DeGaris, of course, was the Leader, and he was the one
who was leading it in terms of the electoral reform and all that. But when it came to
something like the Land Commission it was Murray Hill and other people at various
stages. And I didn’t follow the line – I mean, the sort of procedure was that it was a
conference between the Legislative Council and the House of Assembly. I was just
an observer. Don Banfield or Tom Casey would come along and say, ‘We object to
all these amendments.’ I thought, ‘Well, that’s bloody stupid.’ So when I was
leading for the Legislative Council I’d say, ‘Well, the Council objects to these
amendments. But, since they were proposed by the Honourable Murray Hill, I think
it’s better if he explains them.’ It seemed to me stupid for me to mouth his
arguments, which I had opposed in the Legislative Council. I would be there
nominally as leading for the Legislative Council but I didn’t really feel it was my
job to argue against Don or Hugh Hudson or whoever it was (laughs) on their
behalf. That was really much more sensible, because that’s the reality of the
situation.

Was there any pattern to the opposition, like some ideology – you know, there
were the right-wing conservatives, if you like -- --?"
Well, there were times certainly – particularly something like the Land Commission. Land speculation is so important in capital formation. So many of the big capitalists started their accumulation – Berlusconi onward – from doing land deals. The idea that the Land Commission might interfere with this was really very strongly-opposed. You know the story of the Land Commission and how Don finally had to give way on vital points; but when we looked at the fine print afterwards, we realised he hadn’t given anything away. The opportunity for the developers to develop the land themselves instead of having it acquired was a totally useless piece of protection because there was no way they could develop it in the time that they’d been given.

You mentioned Murray Hill being the Leader. Was he being pushed by certain people, including the industry?

I’m sure he was being pushed by the land developers, yes. So he was very much involved in – because we had the Land Commission and we did lots of Planning Act things, and so they were strongly opposed. DeGaris was very much involved in electoral reform and things like that, and so there were different people within it. Then, of course, they tended to change and we got Griffith and –

I know the one, yes. Burdett.

– Burdett, yes.

Interesting. And did you work out their psychology and what made them tick and what they might agree to or not agree to based on certain arguments or ways of dealing, of talking – trading, talking turkey?

Well, sometimes it was done behind the scenes that is it didn’t go to a conference; you agreed to some amendments and then they let others through, _et cetera_. So there was a certain amount of back-door trading. Other occasions, it had to go to a conference and then it was more open horse-trading. The great thing about the conferences, they were supposed to be not really public, although other times that people did release what was happening, but the whole idea – it always seems to me an enormous problem within any democratic situation is how much – we all talk about transparency and accountability and public right to know, but it seems to me
that at certain points you really need to have secret horse-trading; otherwise, you won’t get people to give way on any position, because ——–.

**They don’t want to lose face.**

No. I mean, if the compromise fails and it’s publicly revealed you were prepared to give this away, it’s not mentioned that you gave it away in return for something else; it’s just that you gave this away, you did the dirty on some group. It seems to me that’s why it is important in these circumstances, and it’s a very tricky area, in terms of how governments should work that some discussions are not public. It’s a bit like cabinet discussions: I think it’s very difficult to know just how much of it should be revealed, because I think there is a need at times to do a bit of horse-trading.

**And were any of the Labor people seen as the – ‘Well, we’re in trouble on this. Bring in the big negotiator who can sort things out’? Or did it generally follow a particular issue that’s being led?**

Well, it’s usually the most contentious things – it’s interesting, because I think Don handled all the Land Commission bills. The planning ones were Hugh Hudson. With the electoral reform, that was Don, Hugh Hudson and Virgo. They were all involved in that. A lot of that bill was Hugh Hudson’s idea, the Legislative Council list system of voting. So yes, the important ones like that, they certainly brought a whole team of big guns. (laughter) Those big ones, I can remember, went on and on and on and on, all through the night; and then, as I say, we got – thank god – this other system, and we just said, ‘Okay, well, we’ll meet again in the morning.’

**Just asking about Don’s political leadership, there were a couple of aspects there: one on issues that either the Caucus or the Ministry wasn’t really up with him on; and then the public – like the industrial democracy I guess was one example of he’d had this idea, he’d spoken to various people and he was pushing this, but certainly industry wasn’t that much onside and the public probably wasn’t tuned into it. And you’d have –**

But also the unions.

— yes, the unions weren’t really onside, either.

I mean, it seems to me incredible. We talk about the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ in the Union Movement, and I never understood, other than there were two different tribes,
what their ideological differences were. They were both conservatives. It seemed to me that, when Don offered them industrial democracy, they were just frightened. The idea that actually they had some responsibility was just too hard. They all gathered together in a huddle and said, ‘No, no, no. We like it as it is. We can fight the bosses. We don’t actually have to make any decisions.’ And it seemed to me that’s what really scuppered the whole idea – besides the fact that, unfortunately, Don got that idiot of a bloke, that pet food bloke –

Yes – Prowse[?], yes.

– yes – who just – well, Don realised after a while that he was a total – – –. But it seems to me that Don had a number of these ideas which he’d – I never talked to him where he got them from; whether he got them from travelling or reading or what – but obviously he was influenced by the German, the experiments of – well, not experiments, actually – putting workers on the boards. Other things like the Jam Factory, which I never understood what it was all about until I came here and realised it was this sort of cluster development idea, like Deruta and Arrezo and Burano and so on. It seems to me a brilliant idea but it’s obviously never taken off in the way that he wanted it to. He had many of these. Again, this Malaysian idea of trying to get the peripheral countries, to have contacts which didn’t necessarily involve the big trade centres.

Did you watch him and think about how he went about selling these things or tried to sell them?

Well, certainly I was involved in the overseas work, but in a sense mine was parallel to what Don was doing. But once Don saw what I was doing he was incredibly supportive, and he had sorted out this Libyan project before I became Minister. That was the most extraordinary thing. The Libyans had sent a letter to the Department of Agriculture in South Australia, asking South Australia to be involved in this agricultural development in the Benghazi area. The letter had gone to the Assistant Director in the Department, who put it into his in-tray, where it stayed for months and months and months because he didn’t know what to say. The General Manager of the Seed Growers Cooperative was in Libya selling seed and the Libyan
Director said, ‘I sent your government a letter. They never replied.’ Of course, he knew who it had gone to, and he knew how hopeless he was, so he went to see Don Dunstan (laughs) and said, ‘The Libyans have asked for a project. Why haven’t you replied?’ So you can imagine – toing! – (laughter) there was an explosion under the Department of Agriculture. Then we got involved in the most disastrous contract that I had ever been involved in. I wasn’t Minister then, so I had my hands tied trying to renegotiate this damn contract with the Libyans. The Department just sold us too cheap. ‘The Western Australians, on the other side of Libya, got double what we did, because we were just so absolutely incompetent.

Did Don campaign in the rural areas himself?

Yes, to a limited extent. We used to go on these trips which were these factory-gate meetings and things like that, but it was very hard to find rural factories. We used to go round the wineries and there were odd cement factories in Angaston and places like that. You’d go there in lunch hour or smoko and you’d give this little talk. Don did a lot of that when I was campaigning for Light. He supported me quite strongly then.

And how did he relate to rural people?

He related to all people, and these were in a sense rural but they were rural workers more than farmers. As far as the farmers were concerned, it was just impossible to get a group together and you couldn’t get the Premier or Leader of the Opposition to go door knocking. You had to try and get some groups together. It was hard enough to get more than a dozen or so at a factory-gate meeting. That was the electioneering that was quite common in those days. He did it in spite of the fact, I suppose, going to factories in Adelaide he would have got a hundred or more but in rural areas it was a couple of dozen at the most. Certainly he was involved throughout.

He never shirked away from talking if the United Farmers and Graziers asked him to speak – in fact, that was a funny thing, (laughs) one of the few occasions when Don’s communications – which were brilliant, normally – broke down. He was asked to speak to the United Farmers and Graziers about the time of the
drought, and I was there in the audience, and he said, ‘I realise that the drought administration is not going very well and I’ve decided to transfer it from the Department of Lands to the Department of Agriculture.’ (laughs) I was there, and that was the first time I’d heard of it. I said, ‘Oh, god! Really?’ (laughter)

**So he hasn’t consulted with you. Interesting.**

Then, of course, the Department of Lands put in a rearguard action, so I was publicly the face of drought administration and it took another three months to get it, because they were fighting against the transfer tooth and nail because they knew that I was on a quite different wavelength. The head of the section resigned the day it was transferred.

**We talked about his support and you mentioned the Policy Unit and things like that. How did you see the role of that central – or the Premier’s Department, and particularly the Policy Unit and Milton Smith’s area?**

I got on very well with them, very well indeed. People like Hugh Hudson used to refer to them as ‘the Gestapo’, and I had no problems at all. Milton Smith and other people used to ring me up and say, ‘We’ve got this cabinet submission of yours,’ and they knew that I or Lynne had written it. So they would contact one of us, not the Department, and say, ‘Look, we don’t quite understand this,’ or, ‘Why are you doing this?’ And so we would talk it over and then they would write their briefing notes for Don. And I found no problems whatsoever with them at all. I thought it was a very sensible way of doing things, and if they didn’t like it they would say so and I would say – and they would often make suggestions, and I might even withdraw the cabinet submission and then resubmit it or something like that.

**Well, just in terms of rounding things up – unless there were some things you wanted to add that I haven’t really asked about?**

Well, all I was going to say is that, in terms of Don’s achievements, it seems to me that his real lasting and greatest achievements, which are not really recognised, are the constitutional changes in South Australia. I referred to it in *Roosters and feather dusters*, that South Australia was a Zimbabwe state, to think that we had such gerrymandering in the Lower House and in the Upper House and everything else.
While Steele Hall did do a partial redistribution, Don really made South Australia a democratic state and there’s no denying that. I think another thing which irritates me is that, when Don died, the rubbish that was talked about all this social reform: yes, of course he did it, but it happened everywhere in Australia at the time. It was time that this was going to happen. He abolished the 6 o’clock swill and so on, but Bolte did in Victoria much the same time, and same with gambling and so on – I mean, those things just weren’t going to survive whoever was around, and I don’t really see that as a big deal compared to what happened in terms of the constitution.

The other side of it is also this tendency to consider politicians in terms of legislative achievements, but also Don had this enormous impact on government, that certainly compared to the previous – oh, who was our Premier?

**Playford.**

No, no, the Labor one.

**Steele Hall?**

No.

**Labor. Oh, gosh.**

Yes. (laughter) The famous one who wrote the letters in writing. Anyway. Obviously a ‘senior moment’. That phrase, were in government but not in power, and Don changed that completely and really – – –.

**Oh, Frank Walsh, of course.**

Frank Walsh, that’s right. And the change – it wasn’t just going round knocking heads together, but it was a making of the government into a more responsive mechanism for what the Cabinet wanted, and modernising it so much. Things like manpower budgets and generally the finance and economics and so on was transformed over Don's period from a really creaky old system which was almost unintelligible to anybody to a real system of management. The only one that I disagreed with – which was not him, but shows you how it sort of took off – was when Tonkin introduced that stupid Yellow Book.
Oh yes – program budgeting.

And I thought that was just the stupidest thing ever, and yet it stuck. I mean, they’re still doing it, aren’t they.

Yes, they are. And the sort of average way – heaven knows where it really fits in, but still. Well, thanks very much, Brian. It’s been a great overview of that time and your contribution to policy and politics. If people want to get into some more detail, they can read your book, Roosters and feather dusters. Good. Well, thank you.

Well, it’s been a pleasure, and there’s always a lot to say; could go on forever; but it does seem to me important, these things –

Sure.

– because I think they get lost, and particularly in the sense that people repeat a story and it’s been written down somewhere and then it goes on. Perhaps if I could only say just one thing, briefly –

Sure, yes.

– and that is that, talking about this Ellis book of how –

Yes – Bob Ellis, yes.

– Bob Ellis – and how he says in that book that Don resigned and that it was all a – I hope I’m not over-paraphrasing him, but more or less that it was a set-up and that he was so scared of this book by these 5DN journalists and that he was wanting to get out of politics for that reason. Ellis got that story from Mike Rann. And Mike was certainly scared, and it was one of those occasions that I don’t know what Mike was doing, really, but he was lobbying cabinet ministers to get Don to take these 5DN people to court. I don’t think Mike had lobbied me, but he’d lobbied other ministers. Don made a cabinet announcement and said, ‘I know a lot of people are saying that I should take them to court, but,’ he said, ‘that is the stupidest thing ever.’ He said, ‘Once it’s in court it’s privileged; it’ll be reprinted in every newspaper; it’ll be reprinted on the television – all with privilege – and,’ he said, ‘while it’s out there, nobody’s touching it. They had to print it privately. Nobody is prepared to do it.’ He said, ‘They’re all scared of being put in court, but once it is in court it’s got
privilege, and,’ he said, ‘it’s stupid to even touch it.’ And I mean he wasn’t scared. I just found Mike Rann was totally off the rails. Go back to the beginning of Don’s career: he was always being abused and mud was being thrown at him, so why should he suddenly be frightened of this? And the idea that this was somehow his reason for resignation was ridiculous.

For the real reasons for his resignation, you need to go back a few months, in the sense that he was exhausted, and that’s what led to the collapse. There were a number of reasons that he was exhausted, and one, of course, was the death of Adele. He had just gone on working and went on working even harder, to get over that. Then this crazy trip that he took on the nuclear issue, which was really done because Hugh Hudson was pushing him so hard to change the policy and he decided to do this whirlwind tour, and he got ’flu and he came back looking as if he was at death’s door. Again wasn’t prepared to take a rest, and that’s what caught up with him.

 Collapse, yes.

 Yes.

 All right.

 Right. Sorry to – we’d already ended, hadn’t we?

 No, no, no – that’s more insight into that period. Good. Well, thanks very much.

 Not at all.

 END OF INTERVIEW