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Corruption and Policy

Abstract

Corruption demoralizes government and weakens the whole endeavour of policy formulation and its implementation. It diminishes services and causes fiscal stress, but most of all it undermines trust and corrodes legitimate community expectations. Corruption takes many forms and is found in many contexts. This paper develops a framework for the analysis of corruption which identifies types, activities, sectors and places (TASP). With the TASP framework identified or suspected corruption in any setting can be analysed as a precursor to the controls and processes that are most appropriate for the control and modification of corrupt behaviour, which ideally can enhance public sector performance. The TASP framework assists in pinpointing the nature, location and context of public sector corruption, and illustrates more precisely where the risks of corrupt activity might arise.   . This paper demonstrates , with empirical work from New York City and the State of Victoria in Australia (Australia's second most populous state), that more precise classification and characterisation of the nature and types of corrupt activity is an essential precondition to the development and design of targeted anti-corruption measures.

The questions that this paper seeks to address are what is the nature of public sector corruption in all its varieties, where might it be located (whether agency or place specific or across public and private sectors or otherwise) whether and how corruption may be measured, and what sorts of risks are perceived for potential corruption in public services.

Newspaper headlines in 2013 reported that Xi Jinping, soon to become Premier of China vowed to fight 'tigers' and 'flies' in his anti-corruption drive. "We must uphold the fighting of tigers and flies at the same time" he said, "resolutely investigating law-breaking cases of leading officials and also earnestly resolving the unhealthy tendencies and corruption problems which happen all around people." (Guardian, Jan 22, 2013).

Across the Pacific Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig (2011) demonstrates that there are two types of corruption that shape American policy making. On the one hand there are the well known and observed phenomena of bribery, extortion, pay to play, misappropriation, nepotism etc. These are primarily in the realm of the "flies", but not exclusively so. More pervasive and insidious, he argues is the dependence that legislators have on campaign donors and other stakeholders. The billions of dollars that come to Congress members and senators do not normally come with strict and specific strings attached, though there are cases when powerful interests are clearly favoured. There is a more insidious situation of congressmen not wanting to support policies or programs that might upset their donors. This dependency on campaign funds and alignment with interests distorts the process, but there is no clear personal

dollar gainfor the congressmen, other than furtherance of their career. In essence Lessig argues (p. 234) it is not just the bad people who effect corruption, but the institutions that make it possible. The US Supreme Court insists on a high bar of proof as to the possibility of a specific 'quid pro quo "in validating legislation dealing with limits on electoral campaign spending (Teachout, 2014).

This makes for a very difficult analytical situation for it is not appropriate to apply the same controls on the one hand to a municipal officer who harasses a street vendor, and extorts a payment so that the vendor can keep his cart in a good spot, as it is on the other hand to examine inducements to ensure that legislation can be written favourably to benefit a corporation or an industry.

Corruption exists in both rich countries and in poor countries, but the nature, extent and overall dynamics of corruption are respectively very different. In the literature we can find cases, mostly in poor countries, that show that corruption is a major factor in a wide variety of domains: water shortages in many arenas, illegal logging in pristine forests, justice administration compromised, health services unfairly delivered with people dying because of corrupt public policy decisions, educational opportunity denied, military procurement distorted, roads poorly constructed, and often going nowhere important, people unable to access clean water, telecommunications infrastructure that excludes many, appalling responses to natural disasters, corrupt regulatory behaviour in the extractive industries, man-made famine, just to mention the most obvious.

In rich countries the basic bribes that characterise so much of every day life in poorer countries are not present, but where they are exposed there is strong public outrage. The syndromes of corruption, described by Michael Johnston a

decade ago (Johnston, 2005) locate different corruption scenarios in different contexts.

Johnston shows that in the case of weak undemocratic state corruption there is little or no societal protection against corruption, and kleptocracy (rule of thieves), patronage and intimidation prevail. Political and economic institutions are weak and there are numerous examples of the unjust enrichment of family and friends of the leaders, not to mention pervasive bribery and extortion at all levels. Institutions are also weak in transitional states where there are weak or ineffectual state mechanisms of control, and thus corruption thrives. This is in contrast to mature state corruption where influence is more subtly traded, connections are made for a fee, and wealth is used to gain access to decision makers , which results in the sharing the spoils such as contracts, mining, energy or other natural resource concessions and favourable laws. Johnston has extended his analysis further (Johnston, 2013). In these rich countries influence markets and shades of grey weave their way through transactions, so much so that the tracking of Xi Jinping's tigers is such a different activity to the swatting of flies

Finland is a country regarded as one of the least corrupt in the world (Transparency International, 2014) A recent analysis by the Finnish Ministry of Justice pointed out that petty corruption, the activities of "flies" or "corruption on the streets" is measurable by the number of cases brought before the authorities, and these are very small. The culture in Finland is such that corrupt behaviours of this sort would be immediately reported. On the other hand, grand corruption ("corruption in the suites") is much harder to identify as it is woven into the fabric of business and public-private sector dealings and is less likely to come to the attention of the authorities (Joutsen & Keranen,

2009). In these sorts of activities there is often a mixing of legal and illegal, ethical and unethical behaviours, and much debate about where lines are drawn.

Traditional analyses refer to petty corruption (flies), grand corruption (tigers) and "state capture."

Petty corruption is characterised by lower level officials who may have opportunities to do things that are wrong, such as using one's office to falsify records that result in a person not having to pay a tax, and in so doing receive a kickback. They might fail to do things that one should do, such as a male police officer failing to issue a ticket to an attractive female driver who has been stopped for excessive speed. Or they might do something permissible, but purposely do it in an improper manner such as issuing a permit for an activity that meets the criteria, but allow it to come to the front of the line in return for a personal benefit or favour. Civil servants who engage in such behaviour, and who receive benefits other than their salary are breaching the trust of their office.

This is very different to the "grand corruption" so often described in the literature (Hellman, Jones et al., 2000; Johnston, 2005; Pope, 1995) where politicians manipulate the instruments of the state for their own personal benefit, and thus terribly distort policy, to the point they effectively 'own' the state and its institutions and resources.

Rather than officials shaking down citizens or kleptocrats dominating business and stealing the country's assets, a "state capture" situations arise where legislation, formally developed and properly passed by the legislature or parliament, grants benefits in a corrupt manner. Outside interests not only

bend state laws, but use their corrupt influence to have laws written for their benefit. Powerful interests can influence or bribe officials and parliamentarians to write legislation that might give a company access to the exploitation of natural resources, a monopoly on a railway line, media and publishing licences or exemption from the payment of taxes.

In transitional economies there is great vulnerability to state capture. In Russia as the economy transitioned from communism to capitalism during the 1990s many state enterprises were privatised. In many cases favours were exchanged for such assets. Factories were privatised and some state assets were disposed of corruptly, though with formal legislation. Oil and gas exploration and transmission was expanded, and huge investments were made in pipelines and transport arrangements. Legislation was written to grant exclusivity, set tax rates, and set regulatory arrangements. Politicians who in effect wrote the legislation were rewarded handsomely. Sometimes they were made company directors and received regular income flows, but overall they sold their legislative integrity. (Yakovlev & Zhuravskaya, 2006)

It is not only in transitional economies that there is state capture. There is a fine line between lobbying in a democratic system where on behalf of companies or industry associations, lobbyists seek to have legislation written to favour their activities or to disadvantage competitors. Sometimes this is done corruptly with payments of cash, sometimes with gifts, sometimes subtly with contributions to political campaigns, or by donations to causes supported by the politician.

Working through this variety of contexts in which corruption may occur it can be seen that corruption poses challenges for the development and

maintenance of sound public policy, and for the corresponding efficient and effective performance of government.

Understanding corruption

A great deal of effort is expended on defining corruption, and analysing the nuances. When applied to a civil service setting, corruption involves the unauthorized trading of one's entrusted authority. A civil servant receives a salary to perform those tasks for which s/he has authorized delegation. If the civil servant does not perform the tasks, or does not perform them well, there may be misconduct, or some form of maladministration (Caiden, 1991). This is different to corruption, where a personal benefit, other than one's salary is received. The benefit might not always be in cash. It could involve favours, holidays, sexual services, inappropriate hospitality or preferment for oneself or one's family (child being admitted to prestigious college when they don't meet admission standards).

There are many motives, including pleasing superiors or not "ratting" on work colleagues.   However, mostly there is greed, and in developing countries there is often need, as civil servants often are forced to eke out a living on subsistence wages. Sometimes the corrupt activity is done to exhibit patronage, and demonstrate that one can deliver for families, cronies, lovers or friends (Gounev, Dzhekova et al., 2012). There are times when the context of the behavior is **structural** – that is the agency or the organisation tolerates breaches of integrity and poor and corrupt practice is embedded in the culture, and there are times when it is **opportunistic**, such as where a highway patrol officer or a health inspector can fail to issue a violation in return for some

personal consideration, cash or otherwise. The participants may be in collusion, and thus all parties are willing, or on the other hand the civil servant might be extorting the other, and thus we have highly unwilling participants. These concepts have been explored elsewhere in more depth (Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, p.28-31).

Corruption is not an easily defined concept. In general terms, legislative attempts to exhaustively define the boundaries of "corruption" fail, given the protean nature of the phrase. Corruption comprehends and encompasses many **types** of behaviour, such as bribery, extortion, cronyism, misuse of information, abuse of discretion. These behaviours can take place by way of different **activities** such as appointing personnel, procuring services, controlling and regulating activities such as issuing permits and licences, constructing things etc. Many of these occur concurrently in different **sectors** such as health, energy delivery, tax administration, justice etc, and in different **places**, such as regions, localities or specific workplaces. These concepts, described elsewhere as TASP (types, activities, sectors, places) provide a framework for the analysis of corrupt events in the public sector. Table 1 illustrates the framework.

Rather than using the blanket term "corruption" to describe a range of events, for analytic purposes corrupt events can be located within the TASP framework. For example there might be bribery (type) in procurement (activity) in mining (sector) in South Africa or in a particular mine (place). There could be nepotism in personnel management in health in a particular hospital. By analysing these respective and distinctive components there can be greater understanding and realistic strategies developed as counter measures.

Table 1 about here

An analytically useful tool is to determine what it is that is being corrupted in the public sector setting, an event, a process or a culture, or a mixture of these. In terms of risk management processes , where and in what way does the risk actually arise ?   Untangling what it is that is being corrupted (or is likely to be corrupted) will be a necessary and substantial   aid in the development of preventive actions or countermeasures. In essence there may be occasions when events are corrupted, on other occasions processes are corrupted, and at other times cultures are corrupted.

Events: Specific activities such as those reported below in the New York cases involved the payment of bribes, looking the other way, altering records etc.

Processes: As perceived by civil servants, corrupt processes are those which allow abuse of discretion, conflict of interest, hiring of family and friends, hiring one's own company for government contracts, perversion of the course of justice etc.

Generally corruption of events and processes come about in the implementation of public policy. Officials do a task, and if, in return for a benefit other than their salary they do not do it as required or do it selectively, or exhibit favouritism then they behave corruptly.

Culture: When we turn to corrupting of cultures, we see a bigger picture. We often see poor political leadership and whether in political or administrative circles, a lack of "tone at the top".

Corrupt organisations have been built on corrupt cultures as we saw in the state of Queensland (Australia) in the 1970s and 1980s where ministers and civil servants took huge financial benefits from corporations they were regulating; where police ran gambling and prostitution and were protected by politicians who also benefitted, and who legislated the very poor policy that created opportunities for the corrupt culture to flourish (Condon, 2013; Prenzler, 2011; Wanna & Arklay, 2010a; Williams, 1991). Cultures of "pay to play" have influenced policy directions and gaming of systems has distorted policy and created cultures of corruption (Lessig, 2011; Salter, 2010).

These dispositions will now be probed by exploring two contrasting pieces of empirical work on public sector corruption, but with the deployment of the TASP framework. The first was a study of corruption in New York City, in which 100 cases of corruption were prosecuted by the City's anti-corruption agency, the Department of Investigations. The methodology involved taking 100 chronologically consecutive cases in 2009. The second was a study of perceptions of corruption and corruption opportunities and risks among senior civil servants in the government of Victoria, Australia's second largest state by population. This involved a questionnaire responded to by 839 senior civil servants in January 2013.Accordingly, this TASP analysis concentrates first on proven examples of corruption (the New York cases), and then applying the TASP mechanism, examines the research study on perceptions of corruption in the Victorian public sector .

Measurement issues: a cautionary note.

It should be noted that measuring corruption is an activity that is fraught with methodological challenges (For more on measurement issues see Kaufmann, Kraay et al., 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay et al., 2007; Sampford, Shacklock et al., 2006). It is however important to try to measure corruption for two main reasons. First, it is an indicator of how well a society is performing in terms of a government's contract or covenant with its citizens. If there is bribery, extortion, misappropriation, self-dealing; if major capital and development projects serve an individual's financial interests rather than the public interest; if corporations bribe public officials to exploit natural resources; if human rights abuses are tolerated; if justice administration is inconsistent with the rule of law; then that society is more corrupt than those in which these behaviours are less or not part of the social fabric. Second, if we know how much corruption there is within a jurisdiction and the nature and quantity of those corrupt events, then remedial actions can be put in place and preventive measures can be implemented.

However, the administrative data on corruption is, and will always be, incomplete. As the activity is nearly always clandestine and covert, then it is in neither party's interest to report it in a survey and have the activity counted in any way.. If the corrupt behaviour was reported, and if a charge were brought it might be classified as obtaining money with menaces, some form of theft, or breach of a public service provision. Many other infractions under these headings might be defined as misconduct rather than corruption, making it difficult to disentangle figures, and the real nature and extent of any corrupt behaviour.

Because of its clandestine nature many of the measures of corruption are not therefore measures of corrupt *behaviour*, but instead measures of people's *perception* of corruption – perceptions of its incidence and perceptions of its nature (de Lancer Julnes & Villoria, 2014; Graycar & Prenzler, 2013, 35). They are, in effect, proxy measurements. These are not measures of the damage caused by corruption. Also it cannot be assumed that perceptions translate into incidence or help us understand prevalence.   It is precisely because of the difficulty in administratively counting corruption that many of the measures of corruption we see are not therefore measures of corrupt behaviour, but are indicators of concern or suspicion rather than solid criminological data. Accordingly, surveys which purport to measure mere suspicions of corruption, but without evidence, proof, report or complaint are not necessarily helpful in determining the true nature and extent of corruption in any society.

Corruption in practice

The cases listed here from the New York study (Graycar & Villa, 2011) illustrate they sort of corruption issues that the Department of Investigations (DOI) encounters. This is quite a large fly swatting exercise. These cases are a small selection from a large data base held by the author. Full details of these and many more can be found on the DOI website. The TASP framework (Table 1 above) has been applied, though in all of these cases *place* is NYC, an urban environment, whereas similar analysis in a non-urban setting could be expected to illustrate different dynamics.

– a crew chief with the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR), received a $60 bribe from a DOI undercover investigator posing as

an Alternative Sentencing Program (ASP) participant in exchange for buying his way out of two days of court-ordered community service in McCarren Park in Brooklyn. In the TASP analysis the **type** of corruption was abuse of discretion; the **activity** was administration of justice; the **sector** was local government and the **place** was a park in Brooklyn. (corrupt event)

— A plumbing inspector employed with the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB), solicited and accepted a $500 bribe from a plumbing contractor in exchange for filing false certificates of inspection with the DOB. He also falsely claimed that he had performed mandated inspections on two residential sewer connections. **Type**: bribery; **Activity** inspecting/ issuing permit; **Sector**: Environment and Water. (corrupt event)

— Seven employees of the New York City Human Resources Administration/ Department of Social Services and eight other individuals generated Medicaid cards (meant for the city's neediest and most vulnerable people) in exchange for a cash fee of approximately $300-$400 per card. This scheme led to the Medicaid Program losing an estimated $3.9 million. **Type**: misappropriation/ abuse of discretion; **Activity**: administering; **: Sector**: Health (corrupt process) **Place** a section within an agency.

— A technician accepted a $100 bribe to alter drug test results. Her role was to collect urine samples as part of pre-employment testing of all job applicants for the New York City Housing Authority. **Type**: bribe; **Activity**: administering; **Sector**: housing. (corrupt event)

- Four building contractors paid USD$ 500 to a supposed Department of Buildings Agent, to overlook several building code violations related to scaffolding safety issues. **Type**: bribery; **Activity**: ensuring safety; **Sector**: construction. (corrupt event)

- A clerical assistant of the Administration for Children Services (ACS), used the names and social security numbers belonging to children in ACS foster care programs, and fraudulently claimed them as dependants on tax returns that he prepared for his clients. The clerk charged each tax client $500 for each child added and gave some of that money to his associate within the service. **Type**: misuse of information; **Activity**: delivering programs; **Sector**: human services. (corrupt process)

- An Inspector of the City Department of Buildings (DOB) was offered a $300 payment to not to issue a violation and stop work order for failing constructions plans in Manhattan. **Type**: bribe; **Activity**: controlling activity; **Sector**: construction. (corrupt event)

The study that first analysed these cases and others, found that what the city lost most was governance capacity (Graycar & Villa, 2011). This meant that the city found its policy and procedures violated by corrupt acts. Interestingly, the capacity loss to the city benefitted private individuals more than the civil servants. The civil servants received small amounts of money for what in many cases were compromises or neglect of safety requirements or violations of procedures.

The study also found that the initiative for corrupt activity came equally from civil servants and members of the public. Eighty percent of the civil servant offenders acted alone, though there were some notable cases of people

perpetrating their corrupt activities in a group. Where this happened there were either management failures or poor culture and adherence to ethical standards. Some positions have greater opportunity, and this applies particularly to inspectors who have a great deal of discretion, and often monopoly power. Half of the cases studied involved inspectors, and a further quarter very low-level workers. Of the 100 consecutive cases only five involved politicians.

A different type of study was conducted in Victoria, Australia. A newly formed anti-corruption authority wanted to assess the extent of corrupt activity, and the perceptions of both the general public and civil servants of corruption in the state.

In Australia, a federal country with a parliamentary system, preventing corruption has not been a matter that is high on the policy agenda. Over the years there have been a small number of experiences of politicians making corrupt and inappropriate decisions, taking payments from corporations, engaging in activities that demonstrate conflict of interest, and when instances of such behavior become public they receive a great deal of media attention and community abhorrence (Condon, 2013; Prenzler, 2011; Wanna & Arklay, 2010b).   In 1988 the state of New South Wales, the largest state (by population) established an anti-corruption agency, the ICAC, (modelled on the Hong Kong ICAC) and over the next 25 years each of the states established an anti-corruption authority of some sort. There has been debate, though it has now subsided to some extent, about whether there should be a federal anti-corruption commission (Hindess, 2003; Roberts, 2005; Uhr, 2005).

In 2013 the state of Victoria established an anti-corruption commission and the commissioned a research project to discover how the general public perceived

corruption in Victoria, how the media reported it, how civil servants perceived and experienced corruption, how integrity was managed within government agencies and how integrity agencies in general carved out their work and what they did. What is reported here are a few salient features from the national survey and from a survey of senior civil servants. (For a description of more of the findings see Graycar, 2014)

A national poll was conducted to ascertain perceptions of corruption and the results showed that

- 43% of the Australian population believe that corruption has increased in the past three years.

- Respondents had exceptionally little personal experience of bribery by government officials.

- 1 in 5 report that state and local government are affected by corruption; 1 in 3 report that federal government is affected by corruption.

- If corruption is suspected or observed, half of the respondents would not know where to report it.

- Two thirds of respondents had little confidence in federal or state government.

- Institutions that people believe are most affected by corruption are the media, trade unions and political parties.

- Institutions that people believe are least affected by corruption are the armed forces, police and the public service.

Full details of methodology and full findings can be found in the survey report (McAllister, Pietsch et al., 2012). In focus groups, participants felt that

corruption was increasing, but very few people could cite an actual example of a corrupt event that personally affected them or their family. Of around 5000 media mentions of corruption in Victorian newspapers, very few related to corruption in Victoria.

So what we have in Australia is a situation where there is a belief that corruption is, if not rampant, at least present, yet it does not take the form of types most commonly associated with corruption, namely bribery, extortion, misappropriation etc.

The results from the survey of senior civil servants shed new light on the nature of corruption as perceived in the implementation of policy.

A total of 839 senior civil servants from across the spectrum of state government responded to a questionnaire on perceptions of corruption. 17% thought that corruption had increased in Victoria in the past 5 years, while 9% thought it had decreased. Notably 42% did not know (see Figure 1). This compares to 43% of the general public believing it to have increased and 9% believing it to have decreased. Interestingly, within the respondents' own departments corruption was generally perceived as low with two-thirds indicating there was little or no corruption in *their* agency. However, many suspected corruption in other agencies. Those in central agencies (Premier's Department, Treasury) thought there was less corruption in their agencies than did people in line agencies (agencies that deliver services such as transport, infrastructure, education and social services etc).

Figure 1 about here

Respondents were asked about corruption opportunities, risks, suspicions and observations. Most frequently identified **opportunities** for corruption within department/agency were conflict of interest, followed by misuse of information, abuse of discretion and hiring friends or family for public service jobs. Corruption **risks** in relation specific public sector activities were generally rated as low. The most commonly identified potential corruption risks were in relation to appointing personnel, buying goods and services and partnerships with private sector. Behaviours most commonly **suspected** and **observed** were hiring family and friends, conflict of interest, abuse of discretion and abuse of information.

In the survey question the **activities**, of the above TASP analysis (Table 1) were probed. Those activities suggested as having the greatest risk were appointing personnel, buying goods and services and partnerships with the private sector. There are certainly risk mitigation strategies that can be put in place to deal with these. Interestingly the respondents ranked a number of activities as containing risk or little or no risk. These are in table 2

Table 2 about here

It is interesting to examine the differences between what respondents saw as opportunities for corrupt behaviour and what they actually observed. In this question the **types** of the above TASP analysis were probed. More than half believed there were opportunities for conflict of interest; misuse of information or material; abuse of discretion; or hiring friends or family for civil service jobs. (see table 3). About half of those who thought there was an opportunity had suspected that behaviour, and half of those who suspected had actually observed. Even so, with between 15% and 25% of respondents observing these things, there is a definite set of tasks for civil service leaders in developing strategies to combat and control these activities.

In contrast, bribery, which is seen as the bane of public service, was suspected by 4% and observed by less than 1%, though almost one third thought there might be opportunities for bribery. There are many interpretations of this data. Perhaps opportunities exist, but civil servants vigorously eschew these opportunities. Perhaps opportunities exist, and civil servants who offend, cover their tracks so very well. The former seems the more likely in the Victorian situation.

Table 3 about here

The survey concluded with two open-ended questions. To the question that asked what were emerging corruption risks for their departments, 36%

responded "abuse of power", and no other response elicited more than 8%. To the question 'what would be the most damaging acts of corruption facing the Victorian government' 56% responded "bribery" and the second highest response was "abuse of discretion" at 12%. This is a particularly interesting response as it demonstrates the corrosive damage that a bribery culture could have, even though bribery was barely suspected, and negligibly observed. The real risks it seems are in abuse of power, abuse of discretion, and nepotism and cronyism.

One in ten respondents had reported corruption, though detailed analysis of corruption reports to integrity agencies in Australia shows that many of these reports are about misconduct and maladministration. Of course these behaviors can very easily morph into corruption, and are often perceived by the public as corruption. They severely damage the ability of the civil service to deliver with efficiency and integrity. Less than half, however (42%) thought their report of corruption had been handled effectively. Almost half of the respondents did not feel confident they would be protected from victimisation should they report corruption. Those who felt less confident were more junior (of the senior ranks) and more likely to be in line agencies than central agencies, especially in human and community services. The effectiveness of one's department/agency integrity framework was generally rated highly with three times as many respondents thinking their department/agency's strategy was effective compared to those who thought it was ineffective. However one-tenth of the respondents were not aware of the existence of an integrity framework within their Department/Agency.

Conclusion

Working from the empirical material the following conclusions can be drawn. Cultures that are corrupted lead to distortions in the making of policy. Examples of this are regarded as particularly egregious in developed countries, and these become the subject of major scandals. We all expect better of our political leaders, and turn on them when they create a culture of corruption.

In the implementation of policy both events and processes can be corrupted. Often the financial gains to the individual and the loss to the government are not large, but trust is diminished and governance capacity compromised. Survey work shows that in a well-functioning civil service the traditional forms of corruption, bribery, extortion and misappropriation are not the major actual or even perceived forms of corruption. Most frequently these are conflict of interest, misuse of information and hiring of friends and families. Bribery however remains at the top of the list as a potential threat to good governance.

The cultures of corruption can be addressed by focussing on major system wide pillars of integrity. The process and events that are corrupted can be addressed not only by focussing on integrity measures, but also by focussing on situational prevention measures. In this respect, the use of the TASP classification framework of corruption (whether actual, suspected or otherwise) should serve as an essential condition precedent and analytical tool to aid the design of effective anti-corruption measures. (these have been explored elsewhere by the author). These preventive measures will be the subject of a different paper.

Table 1. Examples of Type, Activities, Sectors and Places (TASP) of Corruption

Type	Activities	Sectors	Places
• Bribery • Extortion • Misappropriation • Self-dealing • Patronage • Abuse of discretion • Misuse of information • Creating or exploiting conflict of interest • Nepotism, clientelism and favouritism etc	• Appointing personnel • Buying things (Procurement) • Delivering programs or services • Making things (Construction / manufacturing) • Rebuilding things (after a disaster) • Controlling activities (Licensing / regulation/ issuing of permits) • Administering (justice for example) etc	• Construction • Health • Tax administration • Energy • Environment and water • Forestry • Customs and Immigration • Legal system • Disaster relief • Education etc	• Countries • Regions • Localities • Work places etc

Table 2

Perception of risk[a] of corruption at respondent's department N=839

|	Risk (%)	Not a risk (%)
Appointing personnel	29.1	47.3
Buying goods or services	24.5	48.6
Partnership with private sector	22.7	52.3
Controlling activities	22.6	56.6
Ensuring compliance with procedures	18.2	54.8
Grant administration	15.5	63.4
Disposal and sale of organisational assets	14.0	65.0
Using discretionary powers	13.3	63.0
Sponsorship arrangements	12.6	66.3

Note:

a, An activity was deemed to be considered a "Risk" if it was rated 4 or 5 and "Not a risk" if it was rated 1 or 2 on a 5 point scale (where 1 meant not a risk and 5 a major risk). Percentage values for rating of 3 are not presented in this graphs, but were included in the computation. Answers of "Don't know/Not applicable were excluded from computation.

Table 3
Corruption in Department/Agency N=839

	Opportunity %	Suspected %	Observed%
Base: Total sample	839	839	839
Conflict of interest	72	38	20
Misuse of info or material	68	32	15
Abuse of discretion	58	28	15
Hiring friends or family for public service jobs	53	38	25
Hiring one's own or family company to provide services	33	18	9
Bribery	32	4	1
Perverting the course of justice	16	3	2
Don't know	3	6	4
Prefer not to say	0	1	4

FIGURE 1
Perceived change in level of corruption in Victoria (N= 839)

N=839

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