Emotions, 'Phantasia' and Feeling in Aristotle's Rhetoric

dc.contributor.author	Pott, Heleen J.
dc.date.accessioned	2010-03-24T01:01:51Z
dc.date.available	2010-03-24T01:01:51Z
dc.date.issued	2009
dc.identifier.citation	Pott, Heleen J. 2009. Emotions, 'Phantasia' and Feeling in Aristotle's Rhetoric. In E. Close, G. Couvalis, G. Frazis, M. Palaktsoglou, and M. Tsianikas (eds.) "Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University June 2007", Flinders University Department of Languages - Modern Greek: Adelaide, 71-80.	en
dc.identifier.isbn	978-0725811341
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2328/8067
dc.description.abstract	Over the past three decades, philosophy has seen a remarkable revival of interest in the concept of emotion and with it a reassessment of the role of the pathê in the work of Aristotle. Quite a number of scholars claim him as the first philosopher to defend a cognitive approach in emotion theory. I will argue that this claim is one-sided and that his discussions of the passions differ markedly from contemporary cognitive views of emotion.	en
dc.language.iso	en
dc.publisher	Flinders University Department of Languages - Modern Greek	en
dc.subject	Greek Research	en
dc.subject	Greece	en
dc.subject	Australia	en
dc.subject	Heleen J. Pott	en
dc.title	Emotions, 'Phantasia' and Feeling in Aristotle's Rhetoric	en
dc.type	Article	en